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Norm-Taking, Norm-Faking, And Norm-Making: 
Russia And The International Election Observation Norm 
Evgeniya Bakalova 
ABSTRACT 
The paper critically addresses some of the existing theoretical gaps within constructivist norm 
research and proposes an analytical framework for capturing and analysing non-linear variation 
in states’ normative positioning. The study then examines the various stances Russia has been 
selectively adopting in the process of its internalisation, contestation and revision of the interna-
tional election observation norm throughout 2000–2012. The analysis reveals that until recently 
Russia had been primarily adopting a ‘reformist’ rather than ‘revolutionary’ stance, – only epi-
sodically questioning the norm’s legitimacy and avoiding open violations –, and stresses the 
importance of non-material constraints on normative revisionism. 
1 RUSSIA’S ‘NORMATIVE REVISIONISM’? 
The so-called ‘value gap’ (White et al. 2005), ‘normative offensive’ (Makarychev 2009) or ‘clash 
of norms’ (Krastev 2007) denoting Russia’s critical and arguably revisionist positioning against 
‘Western’ normative frameworks are becoming catch-all phrases for denoting and explaining the 
recurrent crises and conflicts in bilateral relations, Russia’s resistance against Western democra-
cy promotion policies at home and abroad, as well as for the country’s domestic authoritarian 
backslide. Yet despite their analytical significance, the substance, theoretical underpinnings and 
explanatory power of these terms appear somewhat blurry. While some have argued that Russia 
has been ‘setting itself up as an ideological alternative’ to the West (Leonard & Popescu 2007, p. 
1) and initiating ‘autocracy promotion’ as a counter-strategy to Western democracy promotion 
(Burnell 2010), others have emphasised that the Russian identity discourse ‘remain[ed] focused 
on Europe and European values’ (Morozov 2009, p. 575) and that there were ‘no ideological 
contradictions between Russia and the West’ (Sakwa 2008, p. 252). Scholars adhering to compet-
ing international relations (IR) paradigms have offered divergent explanations for the compli-
cated and ambiguous dynamics of Russia’s normative positioning towards Europe and the West. 
Whereas supporters of liberal theories have been warning of an ‘international backlash against 
democracy promotion’ (Carothers 2006) and ‘authoritarian diffusion’ (Ambrosio 2010), some 
realist-inspired scholars have assumed the phenomenon of great power ‘neo-revisionism’ 
(Sakwa 2008, p. 251) void of any ideological component. Constructivist scholars, on the other 
hand, have linked Russia’s normative departure from the West to the ongoing identity construc-
tion processes and the ambiguous role of Europe in Russia’s self-perception discourse (Neu-
mann 1996; Hopf 2002; Neumann 2008; Morozov 2009; Makarychev 2009).  
Analysed through the prism of traditional IR paradigms, the phenomenon of Russia’s ‘norma-
tive revisionism’ appears baffling due to its inconsistency and apparent disconnects between 
rhetoric and political behaviour: while repeatedly demonstrating non-compliance with Europe-
an and international democratic and human rights norms (See e.g.: Heller 2008; Saari 2010), 
Russian officials have been persistently employing pro-democracy rhetoric, have until recently 
not shown outright rejection of European normative structures and have not managed to deliver 
any kind of alternative interpretation of fundamental democratic and human rights norms (Pav-
lova 2013; Morozov 2013). 
The limitations of strictly paradigm-driven research explicate the need for innovative, eclectic 
approaches, which account for change and dynamics, and allow analysing the impact and inter-
relations of multiple factors on divergent and contradictory outcomes. Socialisation and diffu-
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sion theories have synthesised and combined rationalist and constructivist perspectives in their 
study of international and national norm dynamics and could provide more insights into the 
complex processes of Russia’s norm internalisation, resistance and/or ‘antipreneurship’ (Bloom-
field 2016). Yet Russia has also presented a puzzling empirical case for traditional norm re-
search. Studies that have applied the classical ‘spiral model’ (Risse & Sikkink 1999) and ‘sociali-
zation theory’ (Checkel 2005) to the case of norm internalisation (or rather failure thereof) in 
Russia were forced to question some of the taken-for-granted assumptions of norm research 
scholarship. These included: the semi-automatic causal link between norm commitment and 
norm compliance; the fixed and uncontested/incontestable nature of socialised norms; as well as 
the view on norm transfer as a one-way street, where local agents, usually in smaller states mate-
rially or non-materially dependent on the West, were prescribed the sole role of norm-receivers 
(Saari 2008, 2010; Heller 2008). Bearing in mind these limitations and open questions, the study 
at hand conducts a detailed investigation into the complex dynamics of Russia’s dispositions 
(from assumed ‘norm-taking’ to alternative ‘norm-making’) towards the norm of international 
election observation. The paper’s objective is two-fold: first, it aims at capturing distinct chrono-
logical phases in Russia’s normative positioning (or ‘normative stances’) and locating specific 
critical junctures in the process. Second, the resulting ‘map’ of normative dispositions provides 
the foundation for tracing the impact of multiple factors on local internalisation and contesta-
tion dynamics, as well as looking into their interrelations.   
The paper proceeds in five sections. First, it provides a brief review of the recent criticisms ad-
dressed towards the traditional norm socialisation literature and elaborates upon some of the 
outstanding theoretical gaps. Second, taking stock of the rigorous theoretical debates, it propos-
es an analytical framework for capturing non-linear variation in states’ normative positioning, 
which takes contestation and normative revisionism seriously and accounts for the so-called 
decoupling of states’ ‘norm talk’ from their actual ‘norm walk’. The third part maps Russia’s 
normative stances towards the international election observation norm throughout 2000–2012. 
Here, the findings of qualitative-quantitative content-analysis capturing the changing discourse 
on the norm are contrasted against the results of a timeline event-analysis of Russia’s behaviour 
in relation to international election monitoring at home and abroad. The resulting map of the 
state’s normative stances serves as a foundation for tracing the impact of multiple factors (both 
rationalist and constructivist) upon Russia’s ‘norm-taking’, ‘norm-faking’ and ‘norm-making’ 
dynamics. The final part discusses the implications of the presented findings for Area Studies 
specialists interested in Russian national and international politics, as well as for scholars of 
norm contestation, norm revisionism and decoupling. 
2 RESEARCH ON NORM INTERNALISATION, CONTESTATION AND REVISION: 
THEORETICAL SHORTCOMINGS AND OUTSTANDING GAPS 
Constructivist-inspired theories of norm diffusion and socialisation have presented multiple 
excellent examples of bracketing the boundaries of meta-theoretical inquiry and have come up 
with complex models for explaining norm dynamics in international relations (Finnemore & 
Sikkink 1998; Risse & Sikkink 1999; Checkel 2005) by synthesising rationalist and constructivist 
explanations (Börzel & Risse 2002; Schimmelfennig 2005), taking into account different logics of 
action and analysing various underlying mechanisms (Schimmelfennig 1997; Risse 2000; Check-
el 2005; Schimmelfennig 2005). However, diffusion and socialisation literature, initially devel-
oped to explain complex processes of international norm development, to study the impact of 
norms on the international system and the role of norm entrepreneurs in bringing about norm 
change and inducing states into compliance with international normative standards, has been 
recently increasingly criticised for certain ‘sins of omission’ (Risse & Ropp 2013, p. 9) and even 
‘biases’ (Epstein 2012; Engelkamp et al. 2012). In this regard it is specifically worth mentioning 
three undertheorized problems, which are gradually opening up new research venues in norm 
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scholarship: the so-called ‘decoupling’ phenomenon, or the gap between norm recognition and 
norm compliance as a manifestation of ‘incomplete’ or ‘failed’ norm socialisation; norm contes-
tation and the (d)evolution of international norms; as well as the dual role of emerging non-
Western powers as ‘norm-takers’ and ‘norm-makers’ in the development of an alternative inter-
national normative order. 
The existence of the so-called ‘persistent gap’ between normative rhetoric on the one hand and 
actual political behaviour on the other (Liese 2006; Hathaway 2007; Hafner-Burton & Ron 2009) 
has challenged the view on the if not semi-‘automatic’ than relatively consequential move from 
norm recognition to norm compliance (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p. 904). Although the spiral 
model never assumed ‘evolutionary progress’ along its stages (Risse & Sikkink 1999, p. 35), it 
nonetheless fell short of accounting for the possibility of norm re-interpretation, resistance and 
even backlash. This limitation partially stemmed from the inherent assumption about the fixed, 
uncontested and incontestable nature of international norms, which has also been challenged by 
recent studies on contestation and norm change (Wiener 2008; Sandholtz & Stiles 2009; Wiener 
& Puetter 2009; Jetschke & Liese 2013). Finally, the treatment of states internalising internation-
al norms as passive norm-takers (not only in theoretical, but also in political terms) has long 
prevented norm scholars from addressing the complex domestic dynamics of norm reception 
rejection and accounting for the possibility of ‘alternative’ norm diffusion (Acharya 2011; Ep-
stein 2012). Innovative conceptual proposals, such as ‘localisation’ (Acharya 2004; Capie 2008), 
‘translation’ (Zwingel 2012; Zimmermann 2016), ‘norm subsidiarity’ (Acharya 2011) and nor-
mative ‘revisionism’ (McKeown 2009) have theoretically addressed some of the outstanding 
limitations. Yet a substantial research gap, relating to contestation practices on the part of pow-
erful states and the impact these might have on their domestic political behaviour in particular 
and upon the development of international normative regimes in general, has not yet been fully 
addressed and appears as urgent as ever.  
First, in order to gain more insight into the so-called gap between commitment and compliance, 
it is necessary to shift the attention from global to national norm dynamics, i.e. towards the 
development of local attitudes towards, discursive representation of, but also practices in rela-
tion to the studied norms. In light of the so-called ‘second generation’ norm research, which has 
been primarily dealing with processes and mechanisms of norm socialization on the ground, this 
might not appear as a particularly innovative proposition. It has already been acknowledged 
previously that despite the fact, that external and internal mobilisation do matter in pushing 
states from symbolical recognition of international norms to behavioural adherence with them, 
and that complex domestic processes of norm reception, appropriation or rejection are vital for 
diffusion outcomes, be it internalisation or otherwise (Cortell & Davis 2000; Acharya 2004; Bob 
2012, p. 185). Yet while diffusion and socialisation research has indeed acknowledged the im-
portance of local-level variables, even though these are often viewed as filters (Risse & Sikkink 
1999) or ‘scope conditions’ (Checkel 2005; Risse & Ropp 2013), extensive research on domestic 
norm dynamics (ranging from rhetorical recognition to compliance, or alternatively from dis-
cursive contestation to political backlash) is still largely missing. At the same time the analysis of 
the different ways in which norms are discursively represented and politically handled within a 
given national context also requires that norms are not viewed as stable, fixed and unproblemat-
ic, but as dynamic and contested, while contestation itself might manifest itself in multiple dif-
ferent (verbal and non-verbal) ways and on a variety of levels. 
Second, if one acknowledges that norms are not fixed, but possess a dual quality as constituting 
and constituted, the discursive representation and interpretation of norms is to be (at least ana-
lytically) separated from (compliant or non-compliant) political behaviour. This also means that 
commitment and compliance should not to be treated as two ends of a continuum (Risse & 
Ropp 2013, p. 10), but as mutually constituted and constituting elements of complex processes 
of norm take-over, reform or revision. The separation of normative rhetoric, so-called ‘norm 
talk’, from states’ behavioural practices allows looking at various instances of ‘coupling’ and 
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‘decoupling’ between them, without assuming linearity and implicit causal linkages between 
norm recognition and compliance, – since norms do not and cannot cause behaviour ‘in the 
sense that a bullet through the heart causes death’ (Kratochwil & Ruggie 1986, p. 767).  
Third, the possibility of alternative norm diffusion (‘bad’ norm-making, or norm ‘antipreneur-
ship’) should also be taken into account. The exclusive focus on norm entrepreneurs and exter-
nal norm ‘socialisers’ as inherently ‘good’ agents of ‘good’ norms has limited norm scholarship’s 
analytical scope and did not allow for studying the promotion and assertion of ‘alternative’ 
norm-sets. This has been extensively criticised by recent studies on discursive representation of 
international norms in domestic contexts and on alternative norm diffusion (see, e.g.: Terhalle 
2011; Bob 2012; Heller et al. 2012; Wunderlich 2013; Bloomfield 2016). Moreover, it can’t be 
assumed that the normative roles states take upon themselves are stable, either. These might 
vary in relation to different norm-sets and towards one particular norm over time.  
The outlined research gaps explicate the need for a revised approach, which would account for 
dynamism, seriously consider the possibility of normative backlash, analytically address the 
‘compliance gap’ and consider the dual role of states as potential ‘norm-takers’ on the one hand 
and ‘norm-makers’ on the other. 
3. A CONCEPTUAL PROPOSAL FOR CAPTURING DISTINCT NORMATIVE STANCES: 
NORM TAKE-OVER, REFORM, REVOLUTION AND THE DECOUPLED ‘GREY ZONE’ 
Empirical studies in the area of norm socialisation and diffusion have repeatedly stressed that 
states’ reactions in regard to international norms cannot be conceptualised in simple binary 
terms as either internalisation or failure thereof, but rather fall into the ‘grey zone’ between full 
acceptance and outright rejection (Kersbergen & Verbeek 2007, p. 221; Dukalskis & Johansen 
2013, p. 571). Such studies have attempted to move beyond the simplistic ‘acceptance/rejection’ 
dichotomy by proposing more nuanced frameworks for capturing variation in states’ disposi-
tions towards international norms. Following the famous inquiry of Hafner-Burton, Tsutsui and 
Meyer1 scholars started paying increased analytical attention to the so-called ‘compliance gap’ or 
‘decoupling’. This phenomenon denotes disconnections in states’ commitments to international 
norms from their actual implementation on the ground (see e.g.: Clark 2010; Cole & Ramirez 
2013; Cole 2013). In a more recent study Dukalskis and Johansen developed a system of so-
called Normative Disposition Indicators, or NDIs, for capturing and analysing variations in 
states’ responses to international norms (2013, pp. 576–577). Drawing on these theoretical and 
empirical considerations the present section will sketch out an analytical framework for studying 
different ways in which norms are handled within the official state discourse on the one hand, 
and in political practice on the other. The aim is to propose a comprehensive conceptual tool for 
mapping variations in states’ normative dispositions. 
On the one hand contestation literature has demonstrated, that domestic discourses on norms 
are not linear (i.e. moving from rejection to total acceptance, or otherwise), but are multifaceted 
and more nuanced, than norm scholarship has sometimes suggested (Kersbergen & Verbeek 
2007; Wiener & Puetter 2009). Actual textual analysis of the relevant corpus of government 
statements, debates and other official communication, i.e. an inquiry into the different ways 
international norms are represented in the domestic discourse, is crucial for making any claims 
as to the progress or failure of socialisation on the ground (Simmons 2013, p. 52). Thus, this 
study differentiates between re-iterative, critical and revisionist state discourses.2 The conceptu-
                                                 
 
1  Thus, Hafner-Burton et al. not only demonstrated cases where treaty ratifications on the part of authoritarian states 
produced little or no effect on actual human rights improvement, but also pointed out to the phenomenon of ‘radical 
decoupling’, – when treaty ratification coincided with increased repressions (2008, p. 132). 
2  Since the study is primarily interested in norm dynamics at the state level, the analysis of textual documents is limited 
to the communication of government officials and does not encompass the entire societal discourse on a specific norm.  
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alisation of compliance on the other hand faces two essential challenges: differentiating between 
implementation, compliance and effectiveness (or input, outcomes and impact); and dealing 
with instances or degrees within one concept (say, implementation). The focus of this study is 
on the various and distinct instances of compliant and non-compliant behaviour, rather than on 
effectiveness or impact. But it is also broader than a strict examination of implementation, since 
it aims at covering a wider range of practices, which go beyond simple fulfilment/non-fulfilment 
of specific treaty obligations.  
Table 1 provides a summary of the conceptual categories for mapping the different ways norms 
can be re-presented, reformulated or rejected in the official discourse, and the variation in 
norm-conforming or non-conforming political practices on the part of rule addressees (the 
state, understood narrowly). Since this research treats discursive and behavioural practices sepa-
rately, it is also assumed that these may be ‘coupled’ or ‘decoupled’ over time, the basic premise 
being that national norm processes are dynamic, open-ended and non-deterministic, thus the 
proposed scheme allows capturing certain normative stances at given moments in time.  
Table 1 
A Conceptual Proposal for Capturing Distinct Normative Stances 
Discursive Handling 
of Norms/  
Political Behaviour 
Compliant Behaviour
Behaviour in line with 
inter-subjectively 
shared international 
expectations of proper 
action. 
Partially Compliant 
Behaviour 
Partial implementation 
or modification. 
Non-Compliant
Behaviour 
Substantial deviation 
from inter-subjective 
expectations, norm 
violation and counter-
activism. 
Re-Iteration 
The norm is acknowl-
edged as universally 
valid, legitimate and 
unproblematic.  
 
Take-over 
 
 
Loose coupling 
 
 
‘Ceremony without 
Substance‘ Decoupling 
Critique
Acknowledged validity 
and legitimacy of the 
norm, but demand for 
certain changes in its 
application. 
 
Loose coupling 
 
 
Reform 
 
Loose coupling 
 
Revision
The norm is denied 
universal validity and 
legitimacy. 
 
‘Substance without 
Ceremony‘ Decou-
pling 
 
 
Loose coupling 
 
 
Revolution 
 
3.1 Norm Take-Over: Internalisation as a Successful Outcome of Socialisation?  
Norm research usually equates norm ‘take-over’ with internalisation, which has in turn tradi-
tionally been understood as a successful outcome of norm socialisation practices on the part of 
norm entrepreneurs, hegemons, international organisations or a broader community of ‘core’ 
states. Yet at the conceptual level neither internalisation, nor socialisation are non-problematic 
and clearly defined in the literature. First of all, there has been a certain deal of confusion be-
tween the two terms, these often being conflated or treated synonymously. This definitional 
problem is connected to the dual nature of the socialisation/internalisation phenomena which 
may denote both process and outcome, and represent causes and consequences at the same time 
(Wetzel 2013, p. 180). Second, even if the distinction between socialisation as process and inter-
nalisation as outcome is clearly made, the causal paths and mechanisms leading from one to the 
other are not easily traceable. Third, and most importantly, it is being disputed what exactly 
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qualifies as internalisation, what constitutes it, and how to identify whether a norm had indeed 
been internalised or not (Rosert & Schirmbeck 2007, p. 280). These issues illustrate how prob-
lematic the conceptualisation of norm take-over as internalisation might be. It is therefore es-
sential to analytically distinguish between internalisation as it is referred to in socialisation re-
search and norm take-over, as it is understood within the framework of this paper. Since this 
study is primarily concerned with the state’s official normative stances, which are viewed as 
dynamic and not fixed , the label ‘norm take-over’ does not and cannot refer to successful social-
isation or complete internalisation when a norm becomes ‘locally owned’. It rather denotes an 
official stance where the state demonstrates rhetorical readiness and willingness to conform to 
specific normative expectations and employs political practices, which are in line with its discur-
sive commitments. Unlike the ‘spiral’ and ‘socialisation/internalisation’ models, which view 
internalisation as a result of a gradual move from the logic of consequences to the logic of ap-
propriateness, norm take-over is void of any assumptions as to the actors’ motivations which are 
often unidentifiable and their long-term effects uncertain.   
3.2 Norm-Reform and Norm Revolution: Norm Adaptation or Normative Revisionism? 
In the recent years political scientists and socialisation scholars have made extensive use of the 
anthropological concept of translation (Zwingel 2012; Zimmermann 2016), the philological 
concept of vernacularisation (Levitt & Merry 2009) and localisation (Acharya 2004) in order to 
describe and analyse complex processes through which international norms are not simply cop-
ied in a top-down manner, but are re-shaped, re-interpreted and reinforced within specific na-
tional contexts. It is generally assumed that such practices contribute to the successful internali-
sation of norms, as they open the discursive field for local perspectives, allow for inclusive delib-
eration and thus facilitate the appropriation of international normative standards. Zimmermann 
and Wolff have recently pointed out to the implicit bias in some studies on localisation, contes-
tation and local resistance, which tend to view contestation practices as per se positive and thus 
run the risk of overseeing or even ignoring its potentially disruptive nature (Wolff & Zimmer-
mann 2016). In line with these considerations it is assumed that ‘norm-reform’ might go in both 
directions: it might signify attempts at accommodating a universal norm which in some aspects 
is incompatible with certain elements of national culture/institutions and would have otherwise 
been rejected, or it might signify an act of watering down and excluding ‘uncomfortable’ ele-
ments for the sake of preserving established practices and institutions. At the same time, while 
localisation and translation are most commonly understood as complex efforts of re-
interpretation and gradual introduction of a global norm into the local context on the part of 
local activists (Levitt & Merry 2009; Acharya 2004), norm-reform is used to describe a short-
term official stance at a certain moment in time.  
Unlike norm-reform, ‘norm-revolution’ implies that a norm is discursively contested in a way 
that challenges the norm’s legitimacy and universal validity and encompasses political practices 
ranging from outright violation to counter-activism. Recent years have witnessed a sharp spike 
in academic interest towards such ‘revolutionary’ normative practices and the possibilities of 
norm erosion, regress or even death usually associated with them (Rosert & Schirmbeck 2007; 
McKeown 2009; Heller et al. 2012; Panke & Petersohn 2012; Jetschke & Liese 2013; Deitelhoff & 
Zimmermann 2013; Bloomfield 2016). Yet most of these studies have primarily looked into cases 
of revisionist contestation in domestic and international discourses without paying much atten-
tion to corresponding political practices. Or have alternatively looked into instances of norm 
violation without tracing the dynamics of contestation discourses.  
This study proceeds from the assumption that there is an important difference between norm 
violation practices coupled with discursive justification in terms of ‘exceptional necessity’ on the 
one hand, and revisionist discourses targeting the norm’s legitimacy and universal validity, and 
followed by violation or even deliberate counter-activism on the other. Addressing this issue, 
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Sandholtz and Stiles have briefly outlined some of the popular misconceptions regarding norm 
violation and alternative norm proliferation (2009, pp. 13–14). The researchers stressed that 
‘rule breaking and rule making’ might converge sometimes, but essentially these are two differ-
ent things (Sandholtz & Stiles 2009, p. 14). This means that the ability of states to violate inter-
national rules without suffering adverse consequences does not necessarily presuppose their 
ability to create or change the norms in question. In a similar vein, Panke and Petersohn re-
affirmed that sole non-compliance does not automatically lead to the abolishment of interna-
tional norms: the ‘norm is abolished if the emerging practice is no longer framed as non-
compliance’ (2012, p. 723). Thus, non-compliance and/or rhetorical strategies of criticism de-
flection do not necessarily lead to norm erosion, even if these are employed by ‘hegemons’ and 
powerful states. More important are the arguments used in the process and their consistency 
(Sandholtz & Stiles 2009, p. 15). McKeown also stressed that a challenge to the norm which only 
presents ‘secretive change in political practice unaccompanied by a legitimating change in dis-
course’ will likely soon die out and leave the prescriptive status of the norm intact (2009, p. 11). 
Consequently within this framework norm revolution denotes an internally consistent stance, 
where revisionist discourses (targeting the norm’s legitimacy and universal validity) are coupled 
with non-compliant or counter-activist political practices. 
3.3 ‘Ceremony without Substance’ and ‘Substance without Ceremony’ Decoupling  
As it has been mentioned previously, the gap between commitment and compliance or the gap 
between ‘norm talk’ and actual norm-conforming behaviour has been traditionally labelled as 
and researched in terms of the ‘decoupling’ phenomenon. While decoupling of formal rules 
from actual practices or the institutionalisation of ‘ceremony without substance’ (adoption of 
formal structures or commitment to generalised principles without their incorporation into 
political practice) has long been at the centre of attention of sociologists and sociological institu-
tionalists (See e.g.: Hafner-Burton et al. 2008; Cole & Ramirez 2013), recent empirical studies 
have also documented decoupling in the form of ‘substance without ceremony’ (Frank et al. 
2009; Cole 2013). Studies on norm diffusion and socialisation often do not clearly differentiate 
between behavioural adaptation (changes towards more compliant behaviour without respective 
re-adjustment in the official political discourse) and ‘cheap talk’ (rhetorical adaptation to the 
human rights discourse without corresponding implementation practices). Thus, ‘Fake compli-
ance’ (Noutcheva 2009) denoting ‘insincere’ institutional or behavioural adaptation of external 
norms on the one hand, and rhetorical lip-service on the other are usually both perceived as 
manifestations of incomplete or failed internalisation. Recent studies have suggested, however, 
that despite their similar decoupled nature these are essentially two different phenomena, which 
presumably occur for different reasons. Thus Clark argued that coercive isomorphism and nor-
mative isomorphism tend to produce ‘ceremonial convergence’, or ‘ceremony without sub-
stance’ decoupling, while mimetic isomorphism produces ‘material convergence’ pushing states 
to imitate actual practices without necessarily participating in symbolical ceremony (2010, p. 
88). 
Following the theoretical discussions briefly outlined above, the assumption of this study is that 
different mechanisms, factors and conditions are not contradictory or even potentially mutually 
exclusive, but rather that certain discursive and behavioural outcomes are more or less likely 
depending on the presence and/or strength of particular factors and their interrelation. 
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4 INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION AS AN INTERNATIONAL NORM, 
AND ITS ‘NORMALISATION’ AND INSTITUTIONALISATION IN EUROPE 
International election observation (IEO) or international election monitoring (IEM)3 has be-
come one of the most widespread and broadly practiced activities in the area of democracy pro-
motion and democracy assistance.4 Scholars have noted that ‘by sending out more and more 
delegations to monitor elections in politically transitional countries, the established Western 
democracies have reinforced the basic idea that holding elections is something that civilized 
countries do’ (Carothers, 1997, p. 21). To turn the argument around, inviting international ob-
servers to national elections has gradually become a ‘shared standard of appropriate behaviour’ 
(Hyde 2011, p. 5) for ‘governments not yet under established democracy’ (Kelley 2008, p. 223). 
Yet nowadays ever more observation missions are being invited and sent to monitor electoral 
conduct in ‘established Western democracies’ (Eicher 2009, p. 267; Hyde 2011, p. 6). Previous 
studies on the evolution and socialisation of the international election observation norm5 point 
out to a series of important nuances, which should be taken into account in the study of its dy-
namics ‘on the ground’.  
First, commitment to and compliance with the norm of inviting international observers to na-
tional elections does not automatically presuppose compliance with the norm of free and fair 
elections. The paradox of the IEO norm is not that its surprisingly wide acceptance has pro-
duced little improvement in the electoral conduct of cheating non-democratic states (since the 
presence of monitors is neither necessary, nor sufficient for truly democratic elections), but 
rather that it persisted despite its obvious ‘inconvenience’ for semi- or non-democratic states not 
genuinely interested in organising free and fair elections, but inviting election monitors none-
theless.  
This leads to the second observation: the fact that international election observation has become 
a widespread practice does not necessarily presuppose that it has in fact changed the states’ 
normative beliefs and has acquired the kind of ‘taken-for-grantedness’ needed for successful 
internalisation. Multiple qualitative studies have demonstrated that contestation still occurs 
regularly at the national, regional and to some degree international levels (Carothers 1997; Fawn 
2006; Eicher 2009; Bader 2011). At the same time there are specific regional variations in the 
acceptance of the international election monitoring norm (Kelley 2008, p. 250). It is therefore 
important to specifically look at the national level, also taking into account the regional norma-
tive specificities and institutional frameworks, in order to capture and reveal patterns of national 
acceptance and/or contestation of the election monitoring norm in more detail.  
Although the IEO norm presumably originated in the Americas and was facilitated through the 
pioneering work of the Organisation of American States (OAS) (Santa-Cruz 2005), its ‘normali-
sation’ and institutionalisation has proven to be most intensive in Europe (Kelley 2012, pp. 34–
35). The end of the Cold War and the wave of transformations in post-Communist and post-
Soviet societies have created fertile ground for the development and popularisation of election 
monitoring on the European continent. The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), later Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and in particular 
its Office for Free Elections in Warsaw, later Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
                                                 
 
3  Similar to Kelley (2008, 2012) and Hyde (2011) I use the terms ‘international election observation’ and ‘international 
election monitoring’ interchangeably. For a discussion of the differences between observation (which is sometimes 
used to refer to short-term ‘passive’ observation shortly before, during and immediately after the polling day) and mon-
itoring (more ‘engaged’ long-term practices), see: Bjornlund 2004, pp. 38–43. Domestic observation and monitoring 
are excluded from this analysis. 
4  The number of international observation missions sent to monitor national elections in different parts of the world has 
been growing exponentially since the end of 1980s; as of 2006 more than 80% of elections in the world were interna-
tionally monitored (Hyde 2011, p. 2). 
5  The two most elaborate explanations of the puzzling evolution and diffusion of international election monitoring as an 
international norm have been delivered by Judith G. Kelley (2008) and Susan D. Hyde (2011). 
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Rights (ODIHR), have played a central role in this development. By signing the 1990 CSCE Co-
penhagen Document the participating states agreed that ‘the presence of observers, both foreign 
and domestic, [could] enhance the electoral process for States’ and pledged themselves to ‘invite 
observers from any other CSCE participating States and any appropriate private institutions and 
organizations who may wish to do so to observe the course of their national proceedings’.6 At 
the 1991 CSCE Human Dimension meeting in Moscow they asserted that commitments under-
taken within the Human Dimension were ‘matters of direct legitimate concern to all participat-
ing states and [did] not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned’,7 and 
later, at the Budapest Meeting in 1994 ODIHR was assigned to ‘play an enhanced role in election 
monitoring, before, during and after elections’.8  
Although the OSCE has traditionally been an inter-governmental organisation with a top-down 
operation logic, the development of election observation rules and practices has been occurring 
in a bottom-up pragmatic ‘learning by doing’ manner, through the accumulation of experience 
and identification of best practices (Sender 2012, pp. 44–46). What is more important, the War-
saw Office has been gradually gaining more and more autonomy from OSCE member states and 
its Permanent Council. The OSCE also possesses an inter-governmental pillar in the area of 
election monitoring; the members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA OSCE) regularly 
participate in election observation missions as short-term observers. Some researchers have even 
argued, that specifically ‘among OSCE states, monitoring has acquired a “taken-for-granted-
quality”’ (Kelley 2008, p. 250). Although the reality of election observation in Europe is not as 
optimistic as analysts sometimes depict it (Fawn 2006; Bader 2010; Boonstra 2010), it can never-
theless be stated that with the formalised and unique provisions of the Copenhagen Document 
election monitoring has become a particularly strong standard of appropriate behaviour on the 
European political space.  
5 RUSSIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION NORM: 
FROM ‘NORM-TAKING’ TO ALTERNATIVE ‘NORM-MAKING’? 
As it has been mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Russia presents a challenging empirical 
case for socialisation scholarship (Heller 2008; Saari 2010). Previous studies with a focus on 
Russia and international election monitoring have registered a gradual deterioration in the rela-
tions between Moscow and monitoring organisations in the 2000s.9 Although the late Soviet 
Union and then Russian Federation had either been generally disinterested or content with the 
work and development of international observation within the OSCE during the 1990s, this 
particular area of the Organisation’s activity later became ‘the most negative part of the OSCE’ 
for the Russian authorities (Boonstra 2010, p. 87).  
                                                 
 
6  CSCE Copenhagen Document 1990. 
7  CSCE Moscow Document 1991. 
8  CSCE Budapest Document 1994. 
9  While it is impossible to provide a comprehensive review of all the empirical studies on international election observa-
tion in/and Russia, the following works deserve specific mention: Fawn 2006, 2013; Ghebali 2005; Evers 2009; Saari 
2010; Hutcheson 2011; Sender 2012; Cooley 2015.  
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Table 2 
European Monitoring Organizations in Russian National Elections, 1993–2012 
Year Elections 
OSCE 
(ODIHR/PA) PACE EP EU CIS 
Approx. 
amount* 
1993 
Nation-wide referendum, 
25 April 1993 X N/A 
Constitutional referendum,
12 December 1993 X 36 
Parliamentary Elections, 
12 December 1993 X X X 36 
1995 
Parliamentary Elections 
17 December 1995 X X X X 114 
1996 
Presidential Elections, 
16 June, 3 July 1996 X X X 506+350 
1999 
Parliamentary Elections, 
19 December 1999 X X X 459 
2000 
Presidential Elections, 
26 March 2000 X X 414 
2003 
Parliamentary Elections, 
7 December 2003 X X X 535/200 
2004 
Presidential Elections, 
14 March 2004 X** X X 370/233 
2007 
Parliamentary Elections, 
2 December 2007 X*** X X 130/132 
2008 
Presidential Elections, 
2 March 2008 X X 30/110 
2011 
Parliamentary Elections, 
4 December 2011 X X X 325/208 
2012 
Presidential Elections, 
4 March 2012 X X X 262/282 
Total missions 12 11 2 3 6  
*The numbers represent the aggregated amounts of OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE PA, PACE and CIS observers. 
**According to OSCE PA it did not send an official monitoring mission to Russia’s 2004 presidential 
election; however its observers formed part of the OSCE/ODIRH short-term monitoring team.  
***Although ODIHR refused to send its monitoring mission to Russia in 2007, observers from OSCE PA 
have been present at the Duma poll. 
Sources: Hutcheson 2011, p. 988, OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE PA, PACE, EP, EU, CIS. 
 
Russia together with a number of other post-Soviet states has ‘sought to resist the influence’ of 
OSCE International Election Observation Missions (IEOMs) by ‘challenging […] how they op-
erate, […] and threatening to undermine the whole [election observation] utility of the OSCE’ 
(Fawn 2006, p. 1150), which has also been interpreted as a deliberate attempt at challenging and 
revising the norm of international election observation from within (Saari 2010, p. 104). Parallel 
to this Moscow has been building up an alternative election observation institution within the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) since the early 2000s. Such ‘shadow organizations’, 
as they are sometime referred to in the literature, made up of individual parliamentary delega-
tions from ‘friendly’ countries or even delegations of intergovernmental organisations are be-
lieved to be strategically created and employed in order to limit the influence of critical observa-
tion missions and to grant legitimacy to non-democratic states, not wishing to directly refute the 
monitoring regime (Kelley 2012, pp. 45–47). The CIS election observation activities ‘replicate 
and in large part contradict analogous OSCE efforts’ (Bader 2011, p. 16) by providing non-
democratic governments with tools for fending off international criticism and delegitimizing 
critical organisations and institutions, such as ODIHR. Russia is widely believed to have stood at 
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the centre of this particular effort with the aim of stabilising and supporting authoritarianism on 
the post-Soviet space (Ambrosio 2009; Bader 2011; Tolstrup 2014).  
Summarising the case of international election observation in Russia throughout the 1990s–
2000s, Kelley noted that Russia demonstrated the ‘ability of international monitors to socialize 
countries when domestic conditions [were] favourable’, yet it also explicated that ‘some sociali-
zation is not particularly deep’ and showed just ‘how difficult it is for monitors to influence great 
powers’ (2012, p. 258). The following sections provide a detailed analysis of Russia’s changing 
normative dispositions and trace the influence of multiple factors on the varying outcomes. 
5.1 Mapping Russia’s Normative Stances: International Election Observation 
in Discourse and Practice 
The textual analysis10 of Russia’s official discourse in relation to the IEO norm allows outlining a 
number of preliminary observations (see Figure 2 in the Appendix). Although the issue itself has 
not been particularly salient in the overall official communication throughout the studied peri-
od, the discursive treatment of the election observation norm has shown considerable variation 
over time. Most interestingly, despite the apparent discomfort Moscow felt about the norm, it 
has not gone as far as openly rejecting its legitimacy or universal validity. The timeline event-
analysis11 of the changes in Russia’s political practice also render some relevant preliminary 
findings (see Figure 3 in the Appendix). Thus, the changes in Russia’s behaviour have not oc-
curred in a linear manner (from compliant to non-compliant, or otherwise), but have demon-
strated erratic and even contradicting patterns and combinations of cooperative as well as asser-
tive tactics.  
The preliminary analysis has thus shown that neither the discursive representation of the inter-
national election observation norm, nor Russia’s behavioural patterns in relation to it have been 
stable, but have demonstrated notable fluctuation over time. Figure 1 combines the results of 
content- and event-analyses and demonstrates a general move from ‘loose coupling’ (‘ceremony 
without substance’) in 2000–2003 to an internally consistent ‘reformist’ stance, where critical 
rhetoric was coupled with partially-complaint or modification-aimed political behaviour (in 
2004–2008 and 2010–2012). Consistent with previous empirical observations and with the theo-
retical predictions of the constructivist theory, radical decoupling has proven to be a ‘dynamic 
temporal process’ (Cole & Ramirez 2013, p. 703), rather than a persistent problem, as rationalist 
theory would have suggested. Nonetheless, the distribution of Russia’s stances towards the norm 
does indeed show a certain ‘lag’ in the discourse as compared to practice: the overall language, or 
‘norm talk’, tended to be more affirmative, than the political behaviour accompanying it. Finally, 
the results of timeline event-analysis and the content-analysis of official statements taken to-
gether allow mapping out the distribution of Russia’s normative stances in relation to the elec-
tion observation norm, and pinpointing specific critical junctures, which will be briefly recapitu-
lated in their chronological order. 
                                                 
 
10  Figure 2 (see Appendix) presents the results of a quantitative-qualitative content analysis of 342 statements from 118 
official documents (official statements, press statements, speeches, interviews and articles) of the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Heads of State (Vladimir Putin in 2000–2008 and Dmitry Medvedev in 2008–2012) con-
taining at least one reference to international election observation. The texts were retrieved from the online archives of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mid.ru) and the President of Russia (www.kremlin.ru). All textual sources have 
been analysed in the original language.  
11  The quantitative event-analysis (the results of which are depicted in Figure 3) is based upon 297 coded events, ranging 
from ‘over’-fulfilment of obligations to counter-activism in accordance with the conceptual scheme developed for cap-
turing distinct types of compliant and non-compliant political behaviour. The analysis builds upon more than 1650 
Russian mass media information pieces from 2000–2012 recovered from the Integrum World Wide database (covering 
both pro-government and critical media outlets), primary sources, legal texts, as well as secondary literature (primarily 
OSCE Yearbooks 2000–2012). 
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The first notable conflict between Russia and the OSCE on election observation grounds oc-
curred as early as the year 2000, when the overall norm discourse appeared rather unproblemat-
ic. The reason, quite unsurprisingly, was a contested parliamentary election, yet not in Russia, 
but in Belarus (see also: Ghebali 2005, p. 217; Fawn 2013, p. 65). One month after the election, in 
November 2000 Russia and Belarus drafted a joint proposal for the OSCE Ministerial Council in 
Vienna calling upon ODIHR to conduct a comparative review of the participating states’ elec-
toral legislation in order to assess their conformity with international standards. As it will be 
shown in more detail below, Russia’s active push for reform of the OSCE election monitoring 
standards and practices had begun in 2004 and continued throughout 2005–2007 to somewhat 
subside after the 2008 presidential election. However, Moscow’s parallel activities at developing 
an ‘alternative’ election monitoring structure within the CIS have been somewhat chronological-
ly detached from its assertive reformism at the OSCE and can be dated back to the end of 2000, 
when the Russian Central Electoral Commission (CEC) initiated the preparation of the Conven-
tion on the Standards of Democratic Elections, Electoral Rights, and Freedoms in the Member 
States of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which was adopted two years later at the 
CIS Heads of States Summit in October 2002 (see also: Fawn 2006, p. 1144; Hutcheson 2011, p. 
689). Shortly afterwards the CIS adopted the first official Recommendations for CIS Observers. 
These not only contained detailed provisions for the activities of CIS monitors prior to and dur-
ing the poll, as well as recommendations for preparing the preliminary and final reports, but also 
gave clarifications on what constituted ‘standards of democratic elections’.  
13 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 39 
The analysis strongly suggests that affirmative and neutral statements were employed strategi-
cally (not only in 2000–2003, but throughout the whole period), and do not allow treating the 
increase or decrease in re-iterative articulations as a sign of the norm’s incorporation and ‘nor-
malisation’ within the discourse. This means, that the norm had not acquired a ‘taken-for-
granted’ quality in the first place. While some authors connect the change in Moscow’s attitudes 
towards the election observation norm and the OSCE monitoring framework exclusively to 
ODIHR’s critical reporting of the 2003 parliamentary election (Saari 2010, p. 111; Kelley 2012, p. 
259), a detailed investigation has shown that the roots of the conflict can be traced back to the 
events of the constitutional referendum and presidential election in Chechnya in March and 
October 2003 respectfully (see also: Sender 2012, p. 137). While the refusal of European organi-
sations to monitor the polls in Chechnya substantiated the first direct conflict over the legitimi-
sation of Vladimir Putin’s policy in the Northern Caucasus, ODIHR’s criticism of the Duma 
elections in December 2003 put into question the legitimacy of the whole political system. From 
this moment on the transformation had become evident. If election monitoring had previously 
been seen as routine, although not entirely convenient, practice with certain legitimacy benefits, 
it started being perceived and represented as a discriminatory and even potentially threatening 
activity from the end of 2003 onward.  
Following the critical evaluation of the 2003–2004 elections on the part of ODIHR, Russia acti-
vated its reformist assault at the OSCE. Frank Evers calculated that throughout 2004–2007 Rus-
sia ‘together with varying combinations of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbek-
istan’ confronted the OSCE with some ten position papers dealing specifically with the issue of 
election monitoring (2009, p. 247). Four of these were produced and brought to the attention of 
the OSCE in 2005–2006. Russia’s proposals covered a wide range of topics: election observation 
methodology, procedures regarding mission composition, accountability, reporting, fund alloca-
tion, geographical scope and even working language (see also: Evers 2009, pp. 247–249; Sender 
2012, pp. 147–148). Not only the substance of Russia’s criticism and demands, but also the polit-
ical means of achieving the proclaimed goals were being employed in a situational and seeming-
ly inconsistent manner. These ranged from cooperation initiatives, active lobbying and wooing 
of potential allies to open threats of cutting financial contributions to the OSCE and eventual 
financial pressure. Most of the time ‘soft’ techniques and ‘hard’ pressure were employed simul-
taneously through different channels (parliamentarian, diplomatic and executive). Thus, early in 
2005 Sergei Lavrov reportedly attempted to convince Azerbaijan to join Russia’s OSCE reform 
initiative during his visit to Baku.12 Later in 2006 Russia attempted to hinder the re-appointment 
of ODIHR’s Director Christian Strohal,13 under whose leadership ODIHR refused to take up 
Russia’s invitation to the 2003 Chechen elections and issued its first outspokenly critical report 
of the Duma and presidential elections in 2003 and 2004. At the end of 2006 Russia allegedly 
threatened to leave the OSCE altogether, should its reform proposals be ignored.14 
While Russia’s election monitoring initiatives at the OSCE, faced against strong resistance on 
the part of Western states (especially the United States), were failing to provide the fruits Rus-
sian diplomats had been hoping for, the counter-activist efforts within the CIS were reinvigorat-
ed and even acquired some innovative features in the aftermath of the revolutionary events in 
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan in 2003–2005. These did not limit themselves to strengthening 
the CIS election monitoring apparatus, but also included such moves as: the creation of home-
grown NGOs and letterbox companies, which were used to distort critical coverage of domestic 
                                                 
 
12  Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 3 February 2005, Vneshnepoliticheskiy kurs Azerbaidzhana ostanetsya bez izmeneniy. 
13  RIA Novosti, 2 March 2005. 
14  Kommersant, 6 December 2006. 
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elections and polls in neighbouring states, as well as the establishment of a network of dubious 
election monitoring NGOs registered in foreign countries and featuring foreign experts.15  
In 2007 the situation for the first time escalated into an open conflict. After the failure of the 
Russia-backed proposal for the OSCE Permanent Council ‘On OSCE/ODIHR Observation of 
National Elections’, in effect designed to put ODIHR under direct control of the inter-
governmental Permanent Council and to reduce OSCE election monitoring to a simple presence 
of a limited observer contingent shortly before and at polling day (see also.: Ghebali 2008, p. 85), 
Russia introduced unilateral restrictions on the scope of international monitoring missions at 
the Duma poll in 2007 and the presidential election in 2008. The number of short-term monitors 
was drastically reduced (from around 1000 present at the Duma election in 2003 to a maximum 
of 400) and only 70 experts from ODIHR were invited (compared to approximately 400 present 
at the poll in 2003). Moreover, for the first time the Russian CEC issued invitations with signifi-
cant delays, which made long-term observation practically impossible. This was then followed 
by delays in the issuance of visas for ODIHR experts on the part of the Russian Embassy in War-
saw. The pattern largely repeated itself in the forerun to the presidential poll in 2008, which 
resulted in both ODIHR and PA OSCE cancelling their missions to Russia.  
After this outspoken crisis the year 2009 signified a period of relative calm. Russia continued its 
push for OSCE election observation reform, but did not voice any qualitatively new demands 
and kept referring to the issues it had been stressing throughout 2006–2008. The Central Elec-
toral Commission also switched from confrontational tactics to a more ambiguous approach. On 
the one hand, the CEC was expressly demonstrating its openness and cooperativeness by, for 
instance, inviting ODIHR experts to the opening of an electoral ‘hotline’ in Russian regions,16 on 
the other hand its representatives kept stressing that Russia didn’t require any ‘supervisory 
agency’ or ‘control body’ to pass judgments over the legitimacy of Russian elections and that in 
the absence of collectively defined rules Russia reserved the right to establish its own modalities 
for the presence of international observers on its own territory.17 
This relative calm was followed by a period of reformist inertia. Russia appeared to have lost 
interest in the battle for reform of OSCE election observation practices (See also: Kropatcheva 
2012). Yet the episodic and minor squabbles between ODIHR and Russian authorities proved 
that the conflict had become ‘frozen’ – but not necessarily resolved. In the years 2011–2012, 
which were to open the new electoral cycles in Russia, the old disappointments and disagree-
ments surfaced once again. Yet the degree of hostilities was nothing compared to the previous 
crisis. Russia did not back down on its restrictions regarding the scope of international observa-
tion missions, but made minor, one might say ‘cosmetic’, concessions: ODIHR received an invi-
tation for 200 observers seven weeks prior to the poll. The overall working atmosphere for OSCE 
and PACE election monitors also appeared more or less unproblematic. The repressive focus of 
the Russian authorities had switched from international monitoring bodies to domestic election 
observation NGOs,18 yet although the language of ODIHR and PACE preliminary and final re-
                                                 
 
15  This network included such organisations as: the ‘International Expert Center for Electoral Systems’ (ICES) registered 
in Israel in December 2005, the ‘Independent American Center of Political Monitoring’ registered in the US in 2005, 
the ‘London International Democracy Institute’ (LIDI) registered in Great Britain, and the ‘Zentraleuropäische Gruppe 
für politisches Monitoring’ registered in Germany in January 2006. All these entities, according to the information pro-
vided on their official websites, were created around the second half of 2005 with the primary focus on election obser-
vation on the post-Soviet space. All these organisations listed each other as partners on their official websites and men-
tioned the same people among their ‘experts’.   
16  RIA Novosti, 24 February 2009. 
17  Igor Borisov’s interview in the aftermath of an ODIHR elections seminar: ITAR-TASS, 17 July 2009. 
18  One of the most prominent victims was the voter rights association Golos, which was partially funded by the US Na-
tional Endowment for Democracy and later became subject to the Russian ‘foreign agents’ law in the aftermath of the 
Duma elections and the public rallies against election fraud at the end of 2011. Similar to 2005–2006, which witnessed 
the creation of multiple letterbox companies and ‘international NGOs’ designed to monitor and provide appropriate 
assessments of the elections on the post-Soviet space in the aftermath of the colour revolutions, the pre-election period 
saw the creation of a myriad of domestic state-sponsored election rights and election monitoring NGOs. 
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ports was strikingly reserved, this did not prevent some Russian commentators from accusing 
the European institutions of bias and prejudice against Russia and the newly elected president.19 
The wheels of the OSCE election observation reform were once again set into motion with MFA 
Special Representative for Human Rights, Konstantin Dolgov, calling for the establishment of 
common election observation criteria in Vienna about a month after the poll. A few months 
afterwards Sergei Lavrov announced that Russia was once again preparing reform proposals on 
the issue of election observation for the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Ministerial 
Council. As promised, at the 15th OSCE Council Meeting in Dublin Russia, accompanied by 
Belarus and Kazakhstan, once again submitted a draft decision which suggested a comparative 
review of electoral laws across the OSCE space – an echo of the old proposal first made by Bela-
rus and Russia back in the year 2000.   
5.2 Analysing the Influence of ‘Push and Pull’ Factors: 
From ‘Norm-Taking’ to ‘Norm-Making’ 
What explains the transformations which have occurred in Russia’s normative positioning to-
wards the election monitoring norm throughout 2000–2012? Detailed process tracing allowed 
pinpointing specific ‘push’-factors, inducing the state to engage in discursive criticism and be-
havioural violation (regime dynamics and the transformation of the political system, sovereignty 
concerns and threat perceptions, justice considerations, autocratic solidarisation, material con-
ditionality and external dependence), as well as ‘pull’-factors, inducing state to engage in rhetor-
ical re-iteration of the norm in question and compliant behaviour (OSCE’s internal conditionali-
ty, self-identification with the so-called ‘core’-states, strive for internal and external legitimacy 
and degree of prior national legalization). In the following the relative importance and strength 
of the various ‘push’- and ‘pull’-factors will be assessed in the order provided above. 
5.3 ‘Push-factors’ and Resistance Mechanisms: International Election Observation 
as an ‘Inconvenient’ Norm 
The popular supposition that non-democratic states are more resistant towards efforts of demo-
cratic and human rights norms socialisation, precisely because they are non-democratic (Risse 
& Ropp 2013, pp. 16–17) is in a way tautological. This is especially true for the IEO norm, since 
Russia’s democracy scores have been affected by its disposition towards election monitors and 
the electoral assessments of international monitors themselves. For example, the development of 
the CIRI Electoral Self-Determination Index for Russia indicates changes to the worse – in 2004 
and 2008 (the years of presidential polls). The overall consensus is that the quality of the elec-
toral process has been gradually deteriorating and the regime experienced an autocratic trans-
formation in 2000–2012.20 Yet such quantitative indicators do not allow looking into the specific 
transformations which have been occurring on the ground. 
It is not surprising that certain fluctuations in Russia’s normative stances towards election moni-
toring have occurred parallel to specific personnel changes in the government at large (with 
Vladimir Putin’s re-election in 2004 and Dmitriy Medvedev’s election in 2008), but also at the 
operative level. Thus, shortly before the 2007 ‘crisis’ the Central Electoral Commission experi-
enced significant staff reorganisation and soon emerged as a new (if not central) assertive player 
on the political battlefield between Moscow and election observation institutions alongside the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Aleksandr Veshnyakov, who acted as head of the CEC since 1999, 
was replaced by Vladimir Churov, an outspoken Putin loyalist, ominously famous for his self-
                                                 
 
19  See, e.g.: Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 6 March 2012.  
20  See: Freedom House ‘Electoral Process in Putin’s Russia’, Polity IV scores, CIRI ‘Electoral Self-Determination’ scores. 
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proclaimed ‘first rule’, postulating that ‘Putin is always right’.21 Moreover Igor’ Borisov, former 
Chairman of the Rossiiskii obshchestvennyi institut izbiratel’nogo prava (Russian Public Institute 
for Electoral Law, ROIIP) and a passionate critic of colour revolutions, Western election obser-
vation in general and ODIHR in particular,22 joined the CEC as one of the newly appointed 
members. Churov and Borisov became the two most prominent media figures in the showdown 
between the Russian authorities and the Warsaw Office in 2007 and 2008. While Churov re-
tained his office in the forerun to the 2011 parliamentary elections, Borisov fell short of being re-
appointed. Coincidently the CEC opted for comparably compromising tones in 2011–2012 after 
Borisov’s departure. Yet it would also be too simplistic to treat regime and personnel dynamics 
as the beginning and the end of the story. 
The important change in the officially voiced perception of the norm and the assertive behav-
ioural tactics both within the OSCE and the CIS in 2004–2005 coincided with the events of the 
colour revolutions on the post-Soviet space (Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan). These events 
did not only have significant repercussions for the transformation of the Russian political dis-
course and foreign policy in the neighbourhood, but had direct implications for Russia’s treat-
ment of the IEO norm. Shortly after the ‘tulip revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan in the early spring of 
2005, Moscow held an international conference which brought together politicians and opposi-
tion leaders from the neighbouring states to reflect upon the implications and lessons learnt 
from the revolutionary events in the neighbourhood. This conference stood out in comparison 
to similar academic and/or political events with its list of high-ranking Russian participants, 
among them: then First Deputy of the Chief of the Russian Presidential Administration 
Vladislav Surkov and former adviser to the Presidential Administration Gleb Pavlovskiy. Within 
the general discussion of issues relating to electoral legitimacy the participants reportedly went 
as far as envisioning the creation of an ‘alternative ODIHR’ on the post-Soviet space.23 Almost 
immediately after the event the infamous ‘spin-doctor” Pavlovskiy together with three of his 
business associates and political engineers registered a letterbox company ‘International Moni-
toring Bureau, Ltd’, which in the following years was most prominently featured in media items 
relating to election observation in the countries of the post-Soviet space. A few months later, in 
August 2005, Vladimir Frolov, then Deputy General Director of Pavlovskiy’s ‘Effective Policy 
Foundation’ provided an academic groundwork for this institutional innovation. In his article 
for Rossiya v globalnoi politike (Russia in Global Affairs), Russian analogue of the Foreign Af-
fairs magazine, the author sketched out what he referred to as the Western ‘model of controlling 
election results through managing election legitimacy’ and concluded that Russia should ‘master 
the Western tools of legitimizing the political processes in the post-Soviet space’ as a means of 
‘sovereign and democratic self-defence’ (Frolov 2005).  
This negatively-framed discourse soon surfaced in the state’s official communication as well. 
The year 2007 which marked the first open conflict in the relations between Russia and ODIHR, 
started on a rather dramatic note – with Putin’s famous speech at the Munich Security Confer-
ence. The president took the opportunity to deliver harsh words directed at the OSCE, which in 
his opinion was being transformed into ‘a vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign 
policy interests of one or a group of countries’.24 Although ODIHR was not mentioned by name, 
                                                 
 
21  Kommersant, 9 April 2007, Intervyu s glavoi CYKa Vladimirom Churovym. 
22  At the end of 2005 Igor’ Borisov was prominently featured in the Russian press after having joined the ODIHR mission 
to the parliamentary election in Azerbaijan. Later he attacked the work of ODIHR in Baku pointing out that the mis-
sion came with pre-formulated assessments in order to ‘create a dysfunctional Parliament’ for President Aliev and 
complained that he was forced to sign a statement prohibiting him to make any public comments without ODIHR’s 
consent. 
23  See, e.g.: Aleksandr Portnov, ‘Mezhdu molotom i skal’pelem’, Novye Izvestiya, 7 July 2005; Novaya Gazeta, 7 July 2005, 
Kreml’: Urok polučen – peremena!  
24  Vladimir Putin, 10 February 2007, Vysstuplenie i diskussiya na Myunkhenskoi konferencii po voprosam politiki bezopas-
nosti.  
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the speech did refer to the ‘OSCE’s bureaucratic apparatus’, which was ‘purposefully funded and 
therefore under control’ of foreign states and used as a tool of interference in member-states’ 
internal affairs. The debate was further stirred by pro-Kremlin political experts and loyal ana-
lysts. Shortly before the 2007 parliamentary poll Sergei Markov, member of the Public Chamber, 
Kremlin mouthpiece and to-be Duma deputy, published a text in state-owned newspaper 
Izvestiya exposing Western plans for a ‘birch revolution’ in Russia.25 Repeating the paroles about 
‘orange technologies’ and election ‘de-legitimisation’ schemes, which were becoming increasing-
ly pronounced in the Russian political and public discourses in the aftermath of the Ukrainian 
orange revolution, the author called for ‘resistance counter-projects’ aiming at the neutralisation 
of external de-legitimisation methods. He specifically mentioned international election observa-
tion as one of the political ‘technologies’ for either regime overthrow or defamation of unfa-
vourable political authorities. Within this narrative ODIHR was represented as the core element 
of the ‘corrupt’ system, ‘compromised even more than some of the observed elections’. 
Most of the studies, which have previously analysed Moscow’s reformative stance on the matter 
of international election observation, have interpreted Russia’s criticism of OSCE’s double 
standards as a rhetorical tool for criticism deflection. Yet can Russia’s persistently voiced discon-
tent be easily dismissed as cheap talk or could Russia’s critical disposition towards the IEO norm 
have at least partially been influenced by the perceived inequality in the norm’s application? 
Although the norm of international election observation is often defined as a standard of appro-
priate behaviour for non- or semi-democratic states, the OSCE Copenhagen Document does not 
differentiate between democratic and democratising states and calls upon all signatories to invite 
observers to national elections. The somewhat discriminatory application of the norm in prac-
tice prompted Polish authorities to refuse ODIHR’s monitoring request in 2007. Under strong 
pressure on the part of the OSCE and some Western European states Poland eventually backed 
down and accepted the monitoring mission, but the initial rebuff effectively played into the 
hands of Moscow officials. Thus, Sergei Lavrov did not miss the opportunity to point out that 
‘one OSCE participating state downright refused to invite Strohal to monitor [its election], and 
he had to coax it into issuing an invitation’.26 Later he stated that the ‘presence of [OSCE] mis-
sions is perceived [by the majority of OSCE sates] as a sign of inequality’.27 In response to earlier 
accusations ODIHR started deploying monitors to elections in states that are generally consid-
ered developed democracies. The first missions were sent to the presidential poll in France in 
April 2002 and the US general elections in November 2002.  
Yet after the geographical imbalance had been somewhat corrected, Moscow started voicing 
complaints about biased and politicised assessments of international monitors. A number of 
academic studies also mentioned certain drawbacks in the work of OSCE monitoring institu-
tions, which Russia had been targeting throughout the years. Hutcheson, for example, docu-
mented that in the forerun to the 2003 Duma poll he himself witnessed the draft of the ODIHR 
preliminary report two days before the actual vote (2011, p. 694). Another alleged ‘bias’ con-
cerned Christian Strohal’s refusal to accept the invitation of a limited contingent in 2007 and 
2008. Russia was not the first state to put up obstacles in the way of ODIHR monitors, but it was 
the first time ODIHR had demonstratively cancelled a mission.28  
                                                 
 
25  Sergey Markov, ‘Chestnost’ kak politika’, Izvestiya, 20 June 2007. 
26  Sergey Lavrov, 29 November 2007, Stenogramma vystupleniya i otvetov na voprosy SMI Ministra inostrannykh del 
Rossii S.V.Lavrova v hode uchastiya v zasedanii Soveta ministrov inostrannykh del OBSE. 
27  Sergey Lavrov, 5 December 2008, Vystuplenie Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V.Lavrova na 16-m zasedanii SMID 
OBSE.  
28  In 1996 ODIHR could not monitor the Serbian poll because of ‘extraordinary short notice’ (two weeks in advance). At 
the same time faced with strikingly similar obstacles prior to the 2001 presidential election in Belarus (delayed invita-
tions, visa denials accompanied by references to ‘compliance with international obligations’) former ODIHR Director 
Stoudmann refrained from cancelling the mission and opted for a limited election observation mission instead. 
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However, Russia’s criticism had not subsided even after Christian Strohal was replaced by Janez 
Lenarcic, a Slovenian diplomat who opted for a more cooperative approach towards Moscow 
and even voiced his agreement over some of Russia’s proposals in relation to OSCE election 
monitoring practices. It is true that Lenarcic’s steps in Moscow’s direction were followed by 
some symbolic gestures of good will on the part of the Russian Central Electoral Commission, 
but these did not substitute long-term change. It is generally hard to separate genuine percep-
tions of injustice and unfair treatment from rhetorical justification of misconduct or criticism 
deflection. Yet one does not necessarily have to contradict the other. It can’t be ruled out that 
Russian officials felt genuinely frustrated over certain imbalances in the monitoring work of 
OSCE institutions, while also strategically employing these accusations in order to justify one’s 
own electoral misconduct. 
While the presented arguments regarding the norm’s obvious inconvenience (regime transfor-
mation, fear of a ‘colour’ revolution and justice considerations) for Russian officials can explain 
the state’s growing resistance against IEO in the aftermath of the first critical report of the 2003 
Duma election, they cannot fully account for Moscow’s sudden counter-activist initiatives in 
2000–2002 (see Figure 3). By all accounts Russia had no reason to fear negative reporting as 
early as the year 2000. Reports of international monitoring missions issued in the aftermath of 
the 1999–2000 nation-wide elections radiated optimism. Researchers noted that international 
monitors ‘were initially willing to give Russia the benefit of the doubt and to encourage transi-
tion despite difficulties’ (Kelley 2012, p. 259). A detailed recollection of events shows that the 
initial idea of erecting an alternative monitoring body within the CIS most probably came from 
Belorussian president Aleksandr Lukashenka – which suggests that Russia’s early counter-
activist stance was also driven by authoritarian solidarization. It was presumably the CIS Heads 
of States Council Meeting in Minsk on 1 June 2001 which provided the kick-start for the intensi-
fication of the overall activity in this regard. Commencing the Summit Vladimir Putin an-
nounced that Lukashenka appealed to the CIS as an international organisation to send monitors 
to its upcoming presidential election in September and requested that the CIS Secretariat 
worked out a format for CIS observers’ presence at the poll.29 With the election observation 
norm becoming ever more inconvenient for Russian authorities, Moscow intensified its counter-
activist efforts within the CIS, but the initial idea apparently came from Russia’s authoritarian 
neighbour. At the same time, Moscow’s relative reformist exasperation at the OSCE in 2009–
2011 was preceded by an unexpected blow dealt by its long-term ally in the struggle for OSCE 
election observation reform – Kazakhstan. At the 2007 Ministerial Council Astana supposedly 
agreed to withdraw its support for Russia’s reform proposals in exchange for OSCE Chairman-
ship in 2010 (See: Dubnov 2008). The Madrid Council became an utter diplomatic disaster for 
Russia; none of its proposal had been accepted, not to mention the ‘backstab’ on the issue of 
election observation reform which came from one of its most significant partners. This suggests 
that Russia could not act as a ‘lone crusader’ in its counter-activist or reformist endeavour, but 
needed the support of its autocratic allies.  
Material conditionality or material pressures are usually quoted as one of the important factors 
for inducing states to comply with international norms. Studies which have dealt with the norm 
of international election observation have specifically pointed out to the significance of material 
factors (Western financial support and democratic conditionality on the part of international 
donors) for the overall diffusion of the norm (Kelley 2008; Hyde 2011). Yet Russia can be con-
sidered an outlier case in this regard. In the forerun to the G8 summit in Evian as early as June 
2003 the Russian government indicated that it no longer wanted to be a recipient of internation-
                                                 
 
29  Vladimir Putin, 1 June 2001, Vstupitel’noe slovo na zasedanii Soveta glav gosudarstv SNG. The Council issued a Deci-
sion ‘On the deployment of observers to the Presidential Election of the Republic of Belarus’, which ordered the CIS 
Executive Committee to take over the coordination of CIS observers and called upon the governments of CIS member-
states to provide monitors for the poll. 
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al assistance, but announced its ambition of returning to the development cooperation stage as a 
full-fledged donor. Shortly afterwards Russia was officially removed from the OECD list of in-
ternational assistance recipients and started building up its own donor infrastructure. Although 
some Western states continued providing funds which are commonly considered development 
aid (support for democracy and the rule of law) even afterwards, the Russian government had 
been repeatedly stressing its discomfort over receiving this type of assistance. The conflict over 
Western financial assistance for Russian civil society first surfaced in 2005–2006 with the pass-
ing of the so-called ‘NGO Law’ and later culminated in the forced closure of the Moscow USAID 
office in October 2012. Indeed, such support has not been seen as something to strive for, but as 
shameful and later – with the rise of concerns regarding external interference and fears of an 
exported revolution – as something potentially harmful and even threatening. The fact that 
Russia had been turning increasingly bold in its criticism of the election observation norm at the 
OSCE beginning in 2004 onward, parallel to the strengthening of its economy in the context of 
rising oil prices and the general reduction of Russia’s economic dependency, does not serve to 
either falsify or confirm the rationalist expectation about the power of material conditionality as 
an instrument of inducing compliance.    
5.4 ‘Pull-factors’ and Socialising Effects: Constraints on Normative Revisionism 
The previous section has outlined multiple reasons for the increasing inconvenience of the elec-
tion observation norm for Russian authorities. The transformation of the political system, which 
fostered fears of ‘regime change’ in the aftermath of a series of revolutions in neighbouring 
states, as well as the implicit perception of election observation as an ‘unjust’ and ‘discriminato-
ry’ tool used by Western states to influence Russian internal affairs together with its material 
emancipation from Western donors provide a complex explanation for Russia’s growing re-
sistance against the election observation norm. Yet the more puzzling question is why the Rus-
sian authorities did not engage in discursive revisionism and avoided open violations, despite 
these obvious inconveniences. This section will analyse the constraining factors on Russia’s 
normative revisionism.  
Some researchers have connected Russia’s relative restraint in regard to the IEO norm with the 
socialising power of the OSCE as an international organisation. Thus Rick Fawn saw the fact 
that the Russian government, ‘most inventive […] at trying to resist ODIHR’ (2013, p. 89), con-
tinued to nevertheless invite OSCE monitors as an ‘outstanding example of [OSCE] internal 
conditionality’ (2013, p. 91). Central to Fawn’s concept is not the Organisation’s power of induc-
ing material costs for non-compliance with its norms, but the non-material value, which partici-
pating states ascribe to membership. Internal conditionality might not have been able to prevent 
Russia’s (at times restrained and at times assertive) reformism, but it explicated the necessity of 
providing justification for one’s not-entirely-compliant actions. It is no surprise that during the 
2007 crisis Russian authorities were extensively referring to the provisions of the 1990 Copenha-
gen Document in order to stress their compliance with the ‘letter of the law’. The legalistic ar-
gument, emphasising that the unilaterally introduced restrictions to the monitors’ mandate were 
in full compliance with Russia’s OSCE commitments, was extensively used by both the Foreign 
Ministry and the Central Electoral Commission. Although there is no way to know for sure, 
there are reasons to believe that it were precisely the OSCE commitments which did not allow 
Russian authorities to blatantly violate the norm by not inviting international observers whatso-
ever. Yet as appealing as it sounds, Fawn’s internal conditionality argument is an integral part of 
the explanation story, but not the whole story, since it can only provide a static explanation 
(organisational membership) for the variation which can be observed in Russia’s normative 
stances. Also, the perceived value of the OSCE for Russian authorities has also been a contested 
issue. Multiple studies have pointed out towards the growing frustrations and disappointments 
20 
 
PRIF Working Paper No. 39 
Russia had connected to the Organisation from the end of the nineties compared to the high 
hopes of the early post-Soviet decade.  
Ideational and identity-related factors have already been examined by multiple constructivist 
studies of Russia’s foreign policy (Thorun 2008; Morozov 2009; Makarychev 2008; Neumann 
2008). Most of them referred to Russia’s identity discourse and its instability for the explana-
tion of Russia’s instable policies at home and abroad. At the same time, these studies have regis-
tered certain transformations in the referent role of Europe in Russia’s self-identification dis-
course. It has been argued, that Russia’s normative withdrawal from European values has been 
becoming ever more visible since Putin commenced his second term as president in 2004 (Alli-
son 2006). Shortly after that, Russian officials started increasingly stressing that the state refused 
to participate in European affairs as an ‘object of civilizing influences’, but wanted to be treated 
as an equal among equals (cf.: Allison 2006, p. 166). This phenomenon has been pinpointed by 
Gomart, who noted that ‘Russia has demonstrated its unwillingness to further discourse on the 
universalism of European values, instead developing a discourse on their relativity’ (2008, p. 9). 
What has also been explicitly stressed, however, is that Russia’s identity discourse has tradition-
ally been centred on Europe. One remote, but nevertheless telling example might be drawn from 
the intensive normative squabble between Russia and the Baltic States prior to and shortly after 
their entry into NATO and the EU in 2004. Throughout most of the post-Soviet period Russia 
has been repeatedly and consistently attacking the governments of Estonia and Latvia for human 
rights violations against Russian-speakers. Despite the fact, that Russia has traditionally been 
rather sceptical and distrustful of European democracy and human rights promotion efforts, in 
the case of the Baltic States the EU has been re-presented as a vital and significant actor in so-
cialising its new members in the wake and upon the 2004 accession round. Apart from the refer-
ence towards the EU’s role as a norm-setter and a kind of normative authority for Latvia and 
Estonia the language of Russia’s human rights criticism explicitly and saliently employed refer-
ences to ‘European standards’, ‘European values’ and ‘European norms’, which were represented 
as a sort of étalon de mesure of democratic development which all ‘civilized’ states had to con-
form to. While it is true that the discourse on Europe and Russia’s place in it has been turning 
increasingly negative over the recent decade, the final departure has not yet occurred and can be 
conceived of as one of the restraining effects. 
Another factor, which could have constrained Russia’s normative revisionism, is the wish for 
external and internal legitimacy. At the same time previous studies have observed that Russian 
voters generally tended to view elections which were criticised as fraudulent by European moni-
toring organisations as generally free and fair (Hutcheson 2011). Opinion polls have also indi-
cated a high level of confidence of the Russian electorate in state authorities and domestic ob-
servers as opposed to international observers (both OSCE and CIS). In 2008 only 3–4% of the 
respondents were ready to trust OSCE monitors in the case of contested elections; for compari-
son , the amount of those who would have rather trusted the Central Electoral Commission and 
domestic observers stood at around 30% and 20% respectively.30 Nonetheless the Russian public 
was positively predisposed towards the presence of international monitors in general and agreed 
that the presence of international observers contributed to the free and fair conduct of elec-
tions.31 These somewhat contradictory dispositions within the general public suggest that the 
desire for internal legitimation through election observation might be considered somewhat 
relevant, but cannot be seen as crucial.  
The desire for external legitimation, on the other hand, has proven to be more salient. This was 
evident in the way Russian representatives have been particularly active at international fora – 
                                                 
 
30 VCIOM, 20 January 2008, http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=459&uid=9652 – Accessed 17/08/2015. 
31  VCIOM, 9 October 2011, http://wciom.ru/zh/print_q.php?s_id=762&q_id=54625&date=09.10.2011 – Accessed 
17/08/2015; VCIOM, 9 October 2011, http://wciom.ru/zh/print_q.php?s_id=762&q_id=54631&date=09.10.2011 – Ac-
cessed 17/08/2015. 
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but not so much at home. It was the refusal of European organisations (OSCE ODIHR, OSCE 
PA and PACE) to observe the presidential election in Chechnya in October 2003, which pro-
voked the first meaningful expressions of deep discontent and even insult on the part of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then president Putin himself. In a heated speech at his annual 
press conference almost two years after the actual event Vladimir Putin recalled the incident to 
complain about the hypocrisy of European election observation institutions in particular and the 
West in general: 
[…] I am troubled by these double standards we so often talk about. What do we mean 
when we speak about double standards? […] Afghanistan held elections. […] Kosovo also 
had elections. […] But when we proposed monitoring elections in the Chechen Republic 
– no, they said, this cannot be done, because the conditions are not ripe, although hostili-
ties ended a long time ago, and there are bodies of authority and administration. And 
with Iraqi territory 100% occupied, it is possible to hold elections! […] According to our 
information, just yesterday fighting raged in nine cities and large populated areas – in-
deed, the conditions are normal, and people can go to the polls. But not in Chechnya!32  
The recurrence of this episode in Putin’s official communication suggests its overall significance 
not only for the relationship between Russia and European monitoring organisations (OSCE 
and PACE) in particular, but for the change of attitude towards election monitoring in general. 
For Putin this gesture apparently substituted a personal blow, since it denied him the desired 
legitimation of Russia’s policy in Chechnya. The importance of such legitimation was evident in 
Russia’s ‘courtship’ towards ODIHR prior to the constitutional referendum in the Chechen 
Republic in March and the local presidential election in October 2003. The critical assessment of 
the nation-wide parliamentary poll in 2003 also produced a rather vocal reaction on the part of 
Russia’s OSCE Representative. It was the mission’s doubt in ‘Russia’s fundamental willingness to 
meet European and international standards for democratic elections’33 specifically which was 
met with vocal opposition on the part of Russia’s Permanent Representative at the OSCE,34 since 
this particular statement was perceived as calling into question the legitimacy of Russia’s overall 
political course.  
While as a member of OSCE Russia is only politically (but not legally) bound by relevant com-
mitments (Saari 2010, p. 82), Russian domestic legislation contains detailed provisions regard-
ing the presence and rights of domestic and international election observers. The current Law on 
Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights from 2002 defines foreign (international) observers as ‘rep-
resentative[s] of a foreign or international organization entitled to monitor the preparation and 
conduct of elections and referenda in the Russian Federation as provided by the law’ (Article 
2.43). It is important to note that both international inter-governmental organisations and in-
ternational non-governmental organisations are eligible to send observers to Russian national 
elections. The legislation contains detailed and rather liberal regulations in what concerns the 
rights of international monitors. International observers are entitled ‘to meet with candidates, 
their official representatives, […], voters organizations, observers’, ‘to have access to all docu-
ments […] regulating the conduct of elections’, ‘be present at voting stations, including voting 
premises’ prior, during and after the voting up to the time of the official adoption of voting re-
turns, ‘being provided access to voting lists’, ‘observe the issuance of ballots’, etc.35 International 
monitors have initially been praising Russia’s electoral legislation as ‘very liberal particularly 
                                                 
 
32  Vladimir Putin, 23 December 2004, Press-konferenciya dlya rossiiskikh i inostrannkh zhurnalistov.  
33  ODIHR Final Report 2003. 
34  Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 March 2003, Vystuplenie Postoyannogo predstavitelya pri OBSE A.Yu. Alekseeva 
na zasedanii Postoyannogo soveta, 6 marta. 
35  CEC Resolution No. 10/98-6 2011. 
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regarding the presence of observers’.36 Yet the development of the relevant legislative provisions 
(regarding both foreign and domestic observers) has been showing a slight restrictive trend since 
the early 2000s onwards. While the clauses specifying the rights of observers have remained 
widely unaffected, additional clauses clarifying the responsibilities of international observers 
have been added over time, so that the text of the resolution issued prior to the presidential elec-
tion in 2012 was somewhat contradictory in its formulations. Thus, while international observ-
ers may ‘inform the representatives of the electoral commissions on the results of their findings, 
issue recommendations without interfering in the work of the electoral commissions’ and ‘ex-
press their opinion about the electoral legislation, preparation and conduct of the […] elections, 
hold press conferences and appeal to the mass media after the polling day’, they should refrain 
from expressing bias or preference regarding the work of the electoral commissions and state 
authorities prior, during and after the polling day.37 Although the outlined obligations regarding 
impartiality, integrity, professionalism, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the elec-
toral process closely correspond (and are in some cases completely identical) to the internation-
ally recognised standards of election observation,38 the CEC resolutions have been gradually 
introducing restrictive requirements for the accreditation of international monitors, which are 
formulated in a way that allows for rather broad interpretation and misuse.   
Although the legislation in its direct wording is still very much in conformity with OSCE and 
Council of Europe standards, ODIHR harshly criticised the existing laws for (indirectly) limiting 
the quantity and scope of activities of international monitors prior to and during the State Duma 
elections in 2011.39 Despite this criticism, it should be noted that Russia’s national legislation on 
international observation is still outspokenly permissive and much more comprehensive than 
that of the majority of other OSCE participating states – democratic or not.  
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF NON-MATERIAL 
CONSTRAINTS ON NORMATIVE REVISIONISM 
In the beginning of this paper I have outlined some shortcomings of the traditional norm social-
isation literature and have proposed an alternative non-linear framework for capturing variation 
in state’s positioning towards international norms. This framework provided conceptual tools 
for a more detailed and nuanced analysis of the changes in the discursive representation of in-
ternational norm, and of the various material and non-material factors and mechanisms influ-
encing the coupled and decoupled outcomes. The empirical investigation into the various nor-
mative stances Russia had been selectively adopting in relation to the international election ob-
servation norm throughout 2000–2012 delivered some interesting findings which could be rele-
vant for both Area Studies specialists and socialisation scholars. Two significant findings can be 
singled out in particular: evidence that decoupling of the so-called ‘norm talk’ from political 
practice has proven to be a temporal rather than persistent phenomenon, and the importance of 
non-material constraints on normative revisionism.  
Contrary to the expectations of rationalist scholars, ‘ceremony without substance’ decoupling 
has proven to be self-defeating in the long-run. Yet cognitive dissonance, which in the expecta-
tions of the ‘spiral model’ should have induced Russian authorities to change their behaviour in 
accordance with normative expectations, had reversely lead Russian officials to change their 
generally affirmative discourse to match its assertive political behaviour. The critical discourse 
which was gaining more and more amplitude in Russia’s reformism at the OSCE in turn prede-
                                                 
 
36  See e.g.: ODIHR Final Report 2000, pp. 12–13. 
37  CEC Resolution No. 10/98-6, 2011. 
38  See: UN Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Elec-
tion Observers 2005; Code of Conduct for OSCE/ODIHR Election Observers. 
39  ODIHR Final Report 2011, pp. 16–17. 
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termined its behavioural disposition towards international monitors at national elections. De-
spite harsh international criticism in reaction to Russia’s restrictions regarding the amount and 
scope of international observers as well as the failed attempt at pushing through its reform pro-
posals at the OSCE in 2007, Russian authorities appeared set on sticking to the established pro-
cedures in the run-up to the presidential poll in March 2008 and later in 2011–2012 – despite 
some minor concessions which had been made on the part of the CEC. This appeared to have 
become a matter of principle. As then Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko 
pointed out: in the absence of consensually defined criteria for observers’ work Russia reserved 
the right to define such modalities itself.40 Putin echoed this statement, calling it ‘a matter of 
principle’ that Russia would ‘not allow anyone to impose conditions of any kind upon [it]’, 
meaning that ‘the country has a duty to respect the agreements it has made, but it is not bound 
to abide by conditions imposed from outside’.41 
While it does not appear particularly surprising that Russia was turning more and more critical 
toward the election observation norm in the context of autocratic regime transformation, fears 
of an ‘imported revolution’ and the reduction of its material dependency on the West, the role of 
non-material factors (prior legalisation in national legislation, OSCE organisational conditional-
ity, self-identification as a ‘European’ state) as constraints on normative revisionism is what 
substantiates a more interesting finding. Despite the obvious inconvenience of the election mon-
itoring norm for the Russian authorities, they have not gone as far as openly questioning its 
legitimacy and have refrained from direct violation of the OSCE Copenhagen commitments.  
At the same time the analysis has shown that the presence of these non-material constraints 
cannot be taken for granted and their power should not be overestimated. The mechanisms 
(material emancipation, situational ‘othering’ and discursive de-legitimization of ‘moral entre-
preneurs’) which Russian authorities have been employing throughout the years in order to 
minimise the constraining effects of specific ‘pull factors’ (self-identity conceptions, legitimacy 
concerns, organisational conditionality) show just how fragile normative and ideational factors 
are and how easily their effects can be reversed.  
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